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Summary
This paper describes the Man-in-the-Loop part of a study looking at a concept of detecting and
resolving conflicts during cruise flight by means of airborne systems. The overall study included
fast-time simulations to define a base-line concept, a safety analysis, and a Man-in-the-Loop
experiment to investigate human factors issues. Based on the results of the three sub-studies, the
feasibility of an Airborne Separation Assurance concept for a future Free Flight environment as
defined in this study, could not be refuted.
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1 Introduction
The following (italics) is taken directly from the Report of the Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics (RTCA) Board of Directors' Select Committee on Free Flight (Ref. 8).
"Free Flight" is defined as :
A safe and efficient flight operating capability under instrument flight rules (IFR) in which the
operators have the freedom to select their path and speed in real time. Air traffic restrictions
are only imposed to ensure separation, to preclude exceeding airport capacity, to prevent
unauthorized flight through special use airspace, and to ensure safety of flight. Restrictions are
limited in extent and duration to correct the identified problem. Any activity which removes
restrictions represents a move towards free flight.
Free flight in its mature state is intended to provide aviation users visual flight rules (VFR)
flexibility while maintaining the traditional protection afforded under IFR by using advanced
technology. Intervention is limited to four situations: Tactical (short term) conflict resolution,
traffic flow management (TFM) to the runway's end, unauthorized special use airspace (SUA)
entry, and safety of flight.
In the free flight system, a flight plan will be available to the air traffic service provider to
assist flow management, but will no longer be the basis for separation. It is possible, and highly
desirable, to shift from a concept of strategic (flight path based) separation to one of tactical
(position and velocity vector based) separation. There even may be instances included in the
system's design where separation assurance shifts to the cockpit.
The last sentence of the cursive section is the focus of this study: Free Flight with Airborne
Separation Assurance.
-8-
NLR-TP-98286
2 Method
Free Flight Situation
Because the Free Flight (FF) concept is still in its infancy, a lot of effort was devoted to specifying
a potentially workable Airborne Separation Assurance System (ASAS). As a baseline, the RTCA
concept of an Alert and a Protected zone was used. As indicated by the RTCA, each aircraft will
be surrounded by two zones:
Protected 
Zone
Alert  
Zone
Fig. 1 Protected and Alert Zones
As soon as traffic enters the alert zone an interrogation of the aircraft's position information will
take place by data link. A possible conflict is shown on a display and the crew will have to react
according to predefined “rules of the road”. Previous studies (Ref 1, 6, 9) have shown that
resolving a potential conflict is not always optimally performed by the crew. Therefore it was
decided that a Resolution Advisory (RA) would be part of the concept. This RA had to fulfil the
following requirements:
- As safe as possible, also in non-nominal conditions.
- Transparent to the crew.
- Effective, especially with multiple encounters.
For the initial experimental design several choices were made regarding the concept and first phase
experiment:
- To emphasize the Man Machine Interface (MMI) aspects an extreme form of Free Flight 
was chosen with no Air Traffic Control (ATC).
- Direct routing & optimal cruise altitude for all aircraft. All aircraft used direct routing and 
cruise climb without steps.
- The experiment was limited to the cruise flight phase, however the scenario included 
climbing and descending traffic.
- All aircraft in the scenario were fully equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) transmitter & receiver. Conflict detection & resolution advisory 
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modules were integrated in the cockpit. The transmitter broadcasts the aircraft's position and 
other information needed for conflict detection, to all other aircraft. The ADS-B receiver 
collects the information of all traffic within a certain range in the free flight sector.
- A conflict was defined as an intrusion of the protected zone. The protected zone was 
dimensioned using current ATC standards to be able to relate to existing traffic densities.
Several resolution algorithms were tested during off-line computer simulations with the Traffic and
Experiment Manager (TEM) (detailed in a later section). These simulations showed the Voltage
Potential algorithms (Ref. 3) as most effective. This method has been slightly modified for use in
the resolution module (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2 Geometry of Resolution Method
When a predicted conflict with traffic has been detected by the conflict detection module, the
resolution module uses the predicted future position of own aircraft (will be called own ship) and
of traffic or obstacle aircraft (will be called intruder) at the moment of minimum distance. The
minimum distance vector is the vector from the predicted position of the intruder to the predicted
position of the own ship. The avoidance vector is calculated as the vector starting at the future
position of the own ship and ending at the edge of the intruder's protected zone, in the direction of
the minimum distance vector. The length of the avoidance vector is the amount of intrusion of the
own ship in the intruder's protected zone and reflects the severity of the conflict. It is also the
shortest way out of the protected zone. Therefore the own ship should try to accomplish this
displacement in the time left till the conflict. Dividing the avoidance vector by the time left yields a
speed vector which should be summed to the current speed vector to determine the advised speed
vector. The result is an advised track and a ground speed. Using a three-dimensional vector also
allows an advised vertical speed to be calculated. In case of multiple conflicts within the look-
ahead time, the avoidance vectors are summed. This method fulfilled the earlier mentioned
requirements:
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- Safe, because initially both aircraft manoeuvre to avoid the other as if the other will not react.
The safety of the concept was further investigated in an evaluation using NLR’s Traffic
Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer (TOPAZ), showing it to be feasible compared to
STCA based ATC (Ref. 2).
- - Transparent, because the geometry of the conflict, if shown on a display, leads
indubitably to the Resolution Algorithm.
- Effective with multiple encounters. Both the trails on the TEM and reference 3 show very 
promising results with (very) high levels of density.
A possible drawback of the algorithm is that, because the RA aims at the border, the protected
zone is sometimes grazed, leading to incursions of that zone by lateral distances of up to half a
mile laterally and up to 100 ft vertically.
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3 Apparatus
The Free Flight experiments were conducted using three main components: NLR's Traffic and
Experiment Manager (TEM), NLR's Research Flight Simulator (RFS) and NLR's Avionics
Integration Research SIMulator (AIRSIM). Figure 3 shows the experimental set-up.
CDU
CDU
EFIS
R FS
CDU
TEM
A i r s i m
Fig. 3 Free Flight experimental set-up, enabling multiple “manual” aircraft
3.1 Traffic and Experiment Manager (TEM)
The Traffic and Experiment Manager (TEM) was especially developed for simulating traffic
around the RFS in a Free Flight scenario. Both automatic and interactively controlled traffic can
be generated by the TEM. This traffic around the RFS is simulated using 6 degree of freedom
aircraft models containing autopilot, auto throttle functionality, flight planning functionality and
including a pilot model. The Traffic and Experiment Manager contains all conflict detection and
resolution algorithms, for all aircraft in the TEM, including the RFS.
During the experiment, the TEM was connected to the Research Flight Simulator (RFS) which
was one of the manned aircraft in the TEM. The TEM was also connected to AIRSIM (a
workstation based aircraft simulator). AIRSIM allows manual control of any of the aircraft in the
Free Flight scenario. Thus the TEM served as the experiment and aircraft behaviour controller.
Conflicts in the experiment were generated from the TEM scenario and the surrounding RFS
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traffic could also be controlled interactively to generate specially challenging conflicts in the Free
Flight experiment.
Radio communication was also simulated during the experiment, thus providing Radio/Telephony
(R/T) background, consistent with the traffic situation. Figure 4 shows the TEM screen lay-out.
Fig. 4 Traffic and Experiment Manager (TEM) screen lay-out. The predicted conflict is shown
between KL101 and OS801
3.2 Research Flight Simulator (RFS)
The Research Flight Simulator (RFS) consists of a side-by-side transport cockpit, based on a 4
degrees-of-freedom, low friction motion system. The cockpit of the Research Flight Simulator is a
full glass cockpit with a layout common for modern aircraft, see figure 5.
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Fig. 5 NLR’s Research Flight Simulator.
Avionics software was adapted for this Free Flight experiment. The vision system was adapted to
allow traffic visualization in the outside view and Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System
(TCAS) software was installed in the RFS. The autopilot system was extended with automatic
gating of resolution advisories. Chapter 4 described the adaptions of the Human Machine Interface
(HMI) in more detail.
3.3 Avionics Integration Research SIMulator (AIRSIM)
Non-nominal events were included in the experiment. As the aircraft in the TEM were
automatically controlled in the Free Flight scenario, AIRSIM was used to control the aircraft in a
non-nominal way.
AIRSIM is a highly configurable and flexible desktop flight simulator with the same functionality
as the RFS, using largely identical software. AIRSIM runs on one or two SGI workstations and is
interactively controllable with keyboard and mouse.
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4 Human Machine Interface (HMI)
The HMI-adaptations in the cockpit for the Free Flight environment consisted of modifications to
the navigation display, the aural alerting, the Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) control
panel and the autopilot.
4.1 FF Nav display
The traffic was displayed on the Navigation Display. A Vertical Navigation display was integrated
below the normal horizontal Navigation Display to facilitate vertical manoeuvres. Modified
symbology was used because of the extra available information. The extra information consisted
of:
Traffic and own ship info
- Traffic call sign.
- Track direction.
- Altitude.
- Ground speed.
- Vertical speed (climbing or descending arrow).
- Vertical and horizontal track of own aircraft.
Conflict info
- Protected zone around predicted position of intruder at minimum distance.
- Predicted track-line of the intruder, which connects the traffic symbol with the conflict
  symbol indicating the predicted position of the intruder.
- Time to intrusion.
- Resolution to prevent intrusion by means of:
- graphical co-planar avoidance -vector on Navigation Display (Nav).
- steering bugs on Nav and Primary Flight Display (PFD).
When a conflict occurred with a time to intrusion of less than 5 minutes, the following sequence of
display changes were shown:
· The position of traffic  (highlighted in amber).
· The incursion of the protected zone of  the traffic.
· The traffic resolution.
If, during the above sequence the time to maximum intrusion became less than 3 minutes, the
traffic symbols were shown in red together with a more urgent aural alerting level (using three
tones repetitively instead of one). After a conflict had been resolved the traffic symbol would
remain in the conflict color (amber or red) for 10 seconds as a memory aid for the crew.
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Figure 6 shows the Navigation display with the traffic symbols.
Fig. 6 Navigation display with traffic symbology
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4.2 Aural alerting
Two aural alerts were added as “attention getters” in case of an amber or a red alert.
4.3 EFIS Control Panel
Modifications included:
- Toggle call sign display .
- Modifying clipping range on vertical display.
- Toggle speed info display.
- Toggle altitude info display.
- Toggle time-to-intrusion display.
- Toggle performance limit lines on horizontal and vertical display.
4.4 Autopilot
The Autopilot was modified for (semi-) automatically flying the traffic resolution. This depends on
the experimental condition (See also chapter on experimental scenarios).
-17-
NLR-TP-98286
5 Experimental setup
5.1 Scenarios
Three levels of traffic load and three levels of resolution execution were used making a total of
nine experimental cells. The three levels of density used were: single, double and triple density as
compared to the average density in European airspace. Resolution execution was possible by:
- Manual, in which case the crew entered Mode Control Panel (MCP) entries themselves.
- Execute separate, in which case the crew could choose to auto-enter either the horizontal, or 
the vertical manoeuvre or both, by pressing one or two buttons on the MCP.
- Execute combined, in which case the crew could auto enter the complete manoeuvre by 
pressing a button on the MCP.
These nine conditions were flown in a nominal (everything works as advertised) and in a non-
nominal scenario. The non-nominal scenarios included events such as:
- Anti collision system of other aircraft fails.
- Separation assurance system of own aircraft fails.
- Delay times of system is increased.
- Unexpected manoeuvres such as emergency descents.
The experimental runs would last 20 minutes.
5.2 Experimental Participants
Eight crews were tested consisting of professional commercial European airline pilots. The flight
experience of the pilots varied between 490 and 20000 hours, with an average of 5500 hours.
5.3 Procedure
Pilots were asked to participate on two consecutive days. Pilots received instruction and practice
during the morning of the first day. Testing would take place during the second half of the first
day and during the second day.
5.4 Measures
Head and eye-tracking measures were taken from both subject pilots in the RFS, by means of
Eye-Point-Of-Gaze (EPOG) measuring systems.
All operations on the Flight Management System (FMS) Control and Display Units (CDU), all
operations on the Mode Control Panel (MCP), all conflicts in the Free Flight scenario, the scenario
data itself and the RFS aircraft state variables were recorded for performance measures.
Questionnaires were taken from both subject pilots probing for mental workload, acceptability of
various items and perceived safety.
Finally videotapes were taken from the TEM display and one combined display with Pilot Flying
Flight Instruments and a cockpit overview from a video camera from the RFS cockpit.
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6 Results
6.1 Loss of separation
Next to the non-nominal runs in which loss of separation was forced upon the RFS as dictated by
the scenario, 11 incursions of the protected zone occurred. Eight incursions occurred with one
crew. The maximum incursion measured was .45 nmi laterally and 86 ft vertically, leaving a
minimum separation of 4.55 nmi laterally and 914 ft vertically.
6.2 Conflict times
Figure 7 shows the average times that the RFS was in a predicted conflict situation, across the
nominal and non-nominal conditions, which was the largest effect seen.
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Fig. 7 Mean conflict times measured from the first indication of a predicted intrusion till the
moment of “free of conflict”
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6.3 Manoeuvres
Table 1 shows the average percentages of control parameters used during the avoidance
manoeuvres across the three levels of resolution control. During the manual condition (which
shows crew preference best) “heading” was used 57.9 %, altitude 41.4 % and speed 15.4 %,
including combined types of manoeuvres.
Table 1  Average percentages of control parameters used during the avoidance manoeuvres
Manual Execute separately Execute combined
Heading 57,9 83.0 72.0
Speed 15,4 57,9 47,5
Altitude 41,4 28,8 75,9
6.4 Eye Point of Gaze
Table 2 shows the average percentage of  dwell time on the navigation display and primary flight
display for the pilot flying and pilot not flying.
Table 2  Average percentages of dwell time on the Navigation Display and the Primary Flight
Display during the experimental runs for the Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Not Flying (PNF)
PF PNF
Nav 46.6 47.8
PFD 8.9 6.9
6.5 Subjective Acceptability
The subjective ratings of acceptability were scored on scales from 1 to 5 indicating respectively 
"Perfect in every way" = "5"
"Favorable" = "4"
"Acceptable" = "3"
"Unacceptable" = "2"
"Completely unacceptable" = "1"
Figure 8 shows the averaged acceptability ratings across the three density levels used, which was
the largest effect seen. In all cases the average rating was above 3, indicating acceptable or better.
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Fig. 8 Subjective acceptability rating as a function of traffic density
6.6 Subjective Safety perception
The subjective ratings of  safety were scored on scales from 1 to 5 indicating respectively 
"FF much safer" = "5"
"FF safer" = "4"
"same as ATC" = "3"
"ATC safer" = "2"
"ATC much safer" = "1"
Figure 9 shows the average safety rating across the three density levels used, which was the
largest effect seen.
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Fig. 9 Subjective safety rating
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6.7 Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME)
The subjective workload ratings on a scale from 0-150 during the experiment are shown in Figure
10 for the three levels of resolution control, which was the largest effect seen. All average ratings
are at or below the 40 mark, indicating that crews rate this concept as "costing some effort" or
less.
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Fig. 10  Subjective workload rating on a scale ranging from 0-150.
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7 Discussion and conclusions
7.1 Discussion
An enumeration of the intrusions of the protected zone, which were not prescribed by the scenario
was given in the previous section. The intrusions are mainly grazes of the protected zone, either
vertically or horizontally. This is caused by the resolution algorithm which aims at the exact border
of the protected zone. However, as soon as “clear of conflict” is detected by the system the
aircraft is again free to go back to the original course. If this happens close to the intruder, a graze
of the protected zone can occur. Such grazes could be prevented by an improvement to the
algorithm ensuring getting back on course without triggering a second conflict and/or grazing the
protected zone of the intruder. It is also noteworthy that eight of the 11 grazings were caused by
one crew. This could be explained by the fact that this crew received significantly less training due
to the late arrival of one of the crewmembers.
The overall average of the conflict times, defined as the time from conflict detection till the
moment of clear of conflict,  was 26.2 seconds. A similar study (Ref. 6) done at NASA shows an
average of 58 seconds from detection till initiation of the manoeuvre. One important reason for
more than halving the time shown by the NASA study could be that no priority rules are required
by the NLR concept and the inclusion of a resolution advisory. Because no priority rules are used,
both will manoeuvre halving the overall manoeuvre time. In the NASA study much of the time
was spent by negotiating with datalink which of both aircraft was in the best position to
manoeuvre while during the NLR study a resolution is shown almost immediately when a conflict
is detected, which leads to faster reaction times.
Table 1 shows that even though using heading manoeuvres would give the aircraft an offset of up
to 5nmi versus 1000 ft vertically pilots preferred the horizontal manoeuvre. When asked why in
the debriefing, they would answer that using flight level changes to avoid manoeuvres would not
be acceptable in terms of passenger comfort and economy. Few subject pilots would use the
vertical velocity mode of the MCP, with which a conflict could be resolved by a vertical speed of
200 ft/min or less!
Table 2 shows a relative large percentage of EPOG dwell time of both crewmembers on the Nav
compared to the PFD. One could argue that this is due to the novelty of the display format but no
effect of time was found. The percentages remained the same during the course of the
experiment.
Because crewmembers were given the extra task of traffic separation assurance, in a very busy
environment with newly developed MMI, it was expected that they would react in a negative
manner. Therefore it was expected that the concept would be rated below acceptable, the
subjective safety would be rated less safe as present day ATC and that the workload would
increase with a considerable amount.
Figure 8 to Figure 10 however show opposite results. Even in sessions with triple the normal
traffic density, still 78.8 percent thought the free flight concept was acceptable or better.
Regarding the perceived safety, 71.3 percent of the subject pilots rated the free flight concept as
being as safe or safer as present day western European ATC. During the experiment the mean
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RSME rating during the third set of sessions was 29. This is very comparable to the average rating
of 27.2 with other experiments done at the NLR during cruise-phase under normal routine
conditions (Ref. 4).
7.2 Conclusion
The Man-in-the-Loop experiment could not refute the feasibility of an Airborne Separation
Assurance concept for a future Free Flight environment as defined in this study.
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